While in the first years they achieved considerable results, not at least due to the help of the Czech president Jan Masaryk, the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in forced them into emigration and so brought an end to the Brentano School. In what follows, I shall highlightsome of Brentano'smore problematicand most Cartesianassumptions.
For him, whateveris implied logically from an explicit representationis 'implicit' in that representation. Brentano'spsychic phenomena are simply the acts of inner perception. Alexius Meinong, 'The Theoryof Objects', trans.
Even memoryinvolves presentations. One rather extreme solution, famously proposed by Brentano's student Alexius Meinong, is to hold that there are objects that do not exist. Brentano,TheTrueand the Evident,op. Nonetheless, he produced a number of books in his years in Florence. At other times, however, the reist Brentano was reasserting that intentional relations were genuine indeed paradigmatic relations, expressing part-whole, or accident- substancerelations. Brentano has reflected on time consciousness throughout his life, but has never given a systematic exposition of his position that would give it a static form. In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint Brentano himself did appear to think that a mental state was always related to an intentional object, but in a later appendix he insisted that the "only thing which is required by mental reference is the person thinking. In the same mental phenomenon in which the sound is present to our minds we simultaneously apprehend the mental phenomenon itself. Instead, he conceives both substances and accidents as real things that are related to one another by a particular mereological relation: an accident does not only ontologically depend on the substance, it also contains the substance as a part without, however, containing any supplementary part. Binder In the light of other texts by Brentano from the same period they argue that he distinguishes between intentional correlate and object, and that the existence of the latter does not depend on our being directed towards it. This is possible because one and the same mental phenomenon, my visual experience, is directed not only towards its primary object, the tree, it is incidentally directed also towards itself as a secondary object. AgainstAquinas,Brentanodenies innerperceptioninvolves a rememberingsubsequent to the originalact PES n ,thereis no timetagbetweenthe originalandthe reflexive acts. As a consequence, Brentano denies the idea that there could be unconscious mental acts: since every mental act is incidentally directed towards itself as a secondary object, we are automatically aware of every occurring mental act.
Brentano has reflected on time consciousness throughout his life, but has never given a systematic exposition of his position that would give it a static form. Tye and Dretske, whose views are explained below, think that intentionality is the mark of the mental, and that it can be given a physicalistic reduction.
Brentano has often been described as an extraordinarily charismatic teacher. Life and Work Franz Brentano was born on January 16, in Marienberg am Rhein, Germany, a descendent of a strongly religious German-Italian family of intellectuals his uncle Clemens Brentano and his aunt Bettina von Arnim were among the most important writers of German Romanticism and his brother Lujo Brentano became a leading expert in social economics.
However, the sufficiency claim might be amended as follows: original intentionality is sufficient for mentality. This becomes particularly evident when we consider cases in which we are intentionally directed towards temporally extended objects such as melodies, movies, or goals in a soccer game. If one of the divisives ends in the course of time, e. BRENTANO'S THESIS 7 Brentano's student, Alexius Meinong, sought to explain thought'sabilityto referto all kinds of thingsfrom actualthingsto non-existent gold mountains ,ideal numbers or even impossible objects squarecircles , by positingthese entitiesas havingvarious special kinds of being distinct from actual existence. Brentano borrows Aquinas' and Aristotle's notion of concomitantor additionalconsciousness Bewuf3tseinsnebenbei , whereby the essential features of the primary act are grasped 'incidentally' en parergo, PES Brentanocannot be recruitedon one side or the other in the broad debate concerning materialism and reductionism. Many mental states and events also have "aboutness": the belief that cats are animals is about cats, as is the fear of cats, the desire to have many cats, and seeing that the cats are on the mat. When I graspa complex innerstate,I may not at the same time attendto all the componentpartsof that state but neverthelessthey are all psychologically presentedand may with trainingbe discovered. A person a is taller than another person b, for example, only if both a and b exist and a is, in fact, taller than b. A mental phenomenon can stand in a quasi-relation to an object independently of whether it exists or not. Brentano advocates 'inner perception' as the key to the discovery of our psychic states,thoughhe does not thinkof this as a special faculty of introspection. Bibliography A Materialist Theory of the Mind. Brentanosimply sees it as a featureof psychic acts that they presentwith certainty, though that certaintycan be overlooked and obscuredfor various reasons. DP aims at describing consciousness from a first-person point of view.
For the later Brentano, apparentaffirmationsof non-existentobjects should be rephrased as existential denials. Brentano's account of presentationbelongs within his general classification of mental acts into three 'fundamentalclasses' Grundklassen,PES 45 or 'modes' PES presentations Vorstellungen ,judgements, and 'phenomena of love and hate' or 'relations of feeling', Gemiitstiitigkeiten,PES ; RW 55a classificationwhich owes much to Descartes.
Brentano's second formulationof intentionality,as 'relationto a content', seems at firstglance, to promisea more satisfactoryaccount.
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